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The “Law” of Uneven and Combined Development 
Part 1: Sources and Components 
NEIL DAVIDSON 
University of Glasgow 
 
 
Introduction 
 
The two concepts for which Leon Trotsky is perhaps best known are his version of the strategy 
of permanent revolution, first outlined in Results and Prospects (1906), and the “law” of 
uneven and combined development, introduced in The History of the Russian Revolution 
(1930) and intended to explain the conditions which made the former possible. The term 
“permanent revolution” can be traced to the 1840s and the concept further back still. Trotsky 
infused it with a new meaning, but for tactical reasons during his struggle with Stalin in the 
1920s he often claimed that his conception was essentially the same as that used by Marx in 
1850 (Trotsky 1976: 308; 1981: 349–351) and then by some of his contemporaries, particularly 
Mehring and Luxemburg between the 1905 and 1917 revolutions (Trotsky 1975a: 102; 1975b: 
209). Uneven and combined development was Trotsky’s own coinage, but it too had an 
antecedent in the notion of “uneven development,” which appears as early as the eighteenth 
century. Trotsky was more prepared to accept the novelty of his own concept, but tended to 
downplay its theoretical significance, writing shortly after the term first appeared in print: “As 
a law it is rather vague; it is more of a historical reality” (Trotsky 1972: 116). 
Trotsky was being too modest. I will argue in due course that uneven and combined 
development is in fact one of the most important of all Marxist concepts, but it has not—until 
relatively recently—received the attention it has deserved, even from his followers. Typical in 
this respect is an otherwise important book by Michael Löwy called The Politics of Combined 
and Uneven Development. The first part is perhaps the most accurate and detailed exposition 
ever made of permanent revolution, but the promise of the title remains unfulfilled. Löwy 
devotes precisely three out of two-hundred and thirty-one pages to the subject—which goes 
unmentioned in the index—whose political implications he seeks to discuss (Löwy 1981: 52, 
89–90). However, over the last twenty years uneven and combined development has gone from 
being a concept confined to the Trotskyist left, and on the margins of discussion even there, to 
part of the standard theoretical apparatus available to academics. Much of this transformation 
is due to the efforts of Justin Rosenberg. Awarded the Deutscher Memorial Prize in 1994 for 
The Empire of Civil Society, Rosenberg took the occasion of the Prize Lecture to argue that 
uneven and combined development provided no less than “the key to the lost history of 
international relations” (Rosenberg 1996: 9, and 6–10 more generally). While Rosenberg has 
continued to develop his own approach (see, for example, Rosenberg 2013), the concept has 
been adopted by scholars working in the broader field of Historical Sociology (see, for 
example, Anievas and Nişancıoğlu 2015). For Rosenberg, this is because uneven and combined 
development offers the possibility of overcoming two symmetrical absences within the social 
and political sciences, that of “the international” from Historical Sociology and of “the 
historical” from International Relations (Rosenberg 2007: 479). But the concept has also 
proved useful to those working in quite different fields, including that of World Literature (see, 
for example, WReC 2015). 
As one of the major theoretical innovations to have emerged from the region, uneven and 
combined development would in any case be of interest to readers of East Central Europe, but 
its recent rise to academic prominence makes an investigation of its origins and formation 
distinctly timely. For, as in the case of other concepts appropriated from the classical Marxist 
tradition (think of Gramsci’s notion of hegemony, for example), growing popularity can come 
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at the cost of forgetting or overlooking the historical context in which the concept was 
developed and the political purpose it was intended to serve. This is not to suggest that the use 
of concepts should never be extended beyond what they were originally meant to explain, but 
complete detachment from their intended application can lead to concepts being reduced a 
fashionable label for theoretical positions of a quite different provenance. There is some 
evidence that this is happening in the case of uneven and combined development. 
In this first part of a two-part article I will reconstruct what I call the “sources and 
components” of uneven and combined development, in particular the strategy of permanent 
revolution, the conditions for which it was intended as an explanation, and the theory of uneven 
development, which Trotsky had to extend in order to provide that explanation. In what follows 
I will move between the concepts of permanent revolution and uneven development, tracing 
their historical development from emergence in the eighteenth century—long before either was 
named—until the era of the first Russian Revolution. By this point a relationship between the 
two had begun to be established by Marxists on the centre and left of the Second International, 
and in turn made possible the formulation of the “law” of uneven and combined development, 
to which the second part of the article is devoted. 
 
Origins of Uneven Development 
 
During the first half of the eighteenth century, French Enlightenment thinkers developed a 
stages theory of social development through a series of three increasingly complex modes of 
subsistence: hunting-gathering, pasturage, and agriculture. By mid-century their Scottish 
contemporaries added a fourth, commercial stage. In the initial formulations at least, most 
peoples or nations were expected to traverse all of these stages, albeit at different historical 
times, until they reached the fourth and final one. A small minority of Enlightenment thinkers, 
however, allowed that certain stages could be compressed or bypassed. The first example of 
this type of exceptionalism was formulated, appropriately enough, in relation to Russia. During 
the reign of Peter the Great (1672–1725), Russia was forced by pressure from the more 
advanced absolutisms of Western Europe, particularly that of Sweden, to develop naval and 
military forces of comparable strength. This led in turn to the need for an indigenous 
manufacturing sector capable of at least of producing ships and cannon. In the short term, Peter 
imported not only the technology and technicians, but also intellectuals who could advise him 
on the type of educational system capable of training Russians in engineering and other skills. 
Many of these were Germans who may have seen in the Czar a monarch of the type necessary 
to unite the divided German-speaking principalities. One of these hired savants was Leibniz, 
who had earlier made some of the most famous statements of staged development in early 
Enlightenment Europe. Yet his self-proclaimed “Law of Continuity” is contradicted in a letter 
he wrote to Peter in 1712, claiming that from a position of backwardness, even blankness 
(“tabula rasa”), Russia could borrow what it needed from Europe and Asia, but discard in the 
process what is unnecessary or contingent (Leibniz 1951: 596–597). This may be the first 
reference to what would eventually be called uneven development, although it would find no 
echo for nearly forty years. 
Then, during the 1750s, Turgot opined that his own country, France, “whom Spain and 
England have already outstripped in the glory of poetry,” might benefit from her current 
economic position behind England: “France, whose genius finishes forming itself only when 
the philosophical spirit begins to spread, will owe perhaps to this very backwardness the 
exactitude, the method, and the austere taste of her writers” (Turgot 1973: 58). But the 
suggestion was made only in passing and in relation to culture, not society. It was Turgot’s 
great intellectual successor, Condorcet, who broadened out the conception to non-European 
peoples, although still in purely intellectual terms: “The progress of these peoples is likely to 
be more rapid and certain than our own because they can receive from us everything that we 
have had to find out for ourselves, and in order to understand these simple truths and infallible 
methods which we have acquired only after long error, all that they need to do is to follow the 
expositions and proofs that appear in our speeches and writings” (Condorcet 1955: 178). 
Ironically, it was in Scotland, where the four-stage theory was first formulated, that the 
alternative was elaborated in the greatest detail. Having helped to establish the organic 
metaphor of development (childhood, maturity, and decline) in theory, the reformers 
simultaneously set about subverting it in practice. In the successful attempts to overleap several 
of the stages which England had passed through in moving from the Age of Agriculture to the 
Age of Commerce, we see for perhaps the first time the brute fact of unevenness being the basis 
for a developmental strategy. The radical Presbyterian minister, Robert Wallace, observed in 
1758: “In a smaller nation, where good agriculture and manufactures have been lately 
introduced, improvements will be more sensible, than in a kingdom of greater extent, more 
populous, and where good agriculture and extensive commerce have been of longer standing. 
For this reason, though England is much richer than Scotland, and the improvements of the 
English much greater, the improvements in Scotland may be more striking and sensible.” After 
outlining the “advantages” possessed by the English in their skill at agriculture, manufacturing 
and trade, Wallace argues that their very priority had led them into difficulties. The English 
“have less curiosity than the Scots” and “confine themselves to fewer branches of trade or 
manufactures,” which, although allowing them to master these specialisms, led to new 
difficulties: “All these are so great advantages, that it is scarce to be thought, the English have 
not made proportionally greater advances than the Scots; unless it is supposed, that their more 
early application to trade, and their having carried it to greater a height before the Revolution 
[i.e. of 1688], hath rendered it impossible, or very difficult, for them to multiply their trade in 
the same proportion, as may easily be done by the French or Scots, who may have more lately 
applied themselves to trade” ([Wallace] 1758: 107, 137–138). Here we see the first intimations 
of “the advantages of backwardness” (in relation to Scotland) and “the disadvantages of 
priority” (in relation to England). By the second decade of the nineteenth century Scottish 
writers were reflecting, with some astonishment, how far they had progressed in a matter of 
decades (Anonymous 1815: 537; Scott 1972: 492). Because Scotland could draw on what 
England had already accomplished, it was able to make up the same ground in much shorter 
period of time; but it was so overwhelmingly successful in doing so that—with the exception 
of the Highlands—the socio-economic differences between Scotland and England had been 
overcome by 1815, and the political differences by 1832. No other country in Europe or the 
West more generally would ever complete the transition from feudal agriculture to capitalist 
industrialisation so quickly or completely. The moment was too brief, the result so uniquely 
decisive, for any theoretical generalisation from this experience to be possible. 
There are several differences between the Enlightenment concept of a mode of subsistence 
and the concept of a mode of production introduced by Marx and Engels. For our purposes the 
most important is that Marx and Engels were not proposing a universal succession of stages. 
Those modes of production that they listed in various places were chronological only in two 
senses: one is that they are each more developed than the original classless societies; the other 
is that it indicates the order in which these modes of production arose historically; it does not 
suggest that every social formation is fated to pass under the dominance of each of them in 
succession. In fact, Marx and Engels seem to have regarded only one transition as universal, 
that from primitive communism to different types of class society (Asiatic, slave, tributary, and 
feudal). Beyond that, they seem to have regarded the transition from feudalism to capitalism 
as a possible outcome which was in fact occurring during their lifetime, which in turn opened 
up the possibility for another, final transition from capitalism to socialism. But neither of these 
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two transitions was automatic or inevitable. Two main anticipations of uneven development 
appear in their work. 
The first consists of a cluster of references to a particular form of unevenness arising from 
colonial settlement. In The German Ideology, written in the mid-1840s but unfinished and 
unpublished during their lifetime, they reflected on how these settlements could be established 
on the basis of a purer, more advanced version of the dominant mode of production than the 
societies the settlers left behind. On the one hand, where the settled territory was uninhabited: 
“Thus they begin with the most advanced individuals of the old countries, and, therefore, with 
the correspondingly most advanced form of intercourse, even before this form of intercourse 
has been able to establish itself in the old countries.” On the other hand, where the colonised 
territory was inhabited by peoples at a much lower level of development: “A similar relation 
issues from conquest, when a form of intercourse which has evolved on another soil is brought 
over complete to the conquered country: whereas in its home it was still encumbered with 
interests and relations left over from earlier periods, here it can and must be established 
completely and without hindrance, if only to assure the conqueror’s lasting power, when they 
received the most perfect form of feudal organisation” (Marx and Engels 1975a: 83). The 
examples on which they tended to draw later in their careers were from the feudal period (Marx 
1973c: 490; Engels 2005b: 565). They do not seem to have specifically considered that 
capitalism might also develop in this way. 
The second anticipation is a single passage in review of a book by Frederick List written by 
Marx during 1845. List had argued that Germany should seek to follow the same path of 
economic development as England (List 1904: 156). Marx rejected the idea—and not only in 
relation to economic development: 
 
To hold that every nation goes through this development [of industry] internally would 
be as absurd as the idea that every nation is bound to go through the political development 
of France or the philosophical development of Germany. What the nations have done as 
nations, they have done for human society; their whole value consists only in the fact that 
each single nation has accomplished for the benefit of other nations one of the main 
historical aspects (one of the main determinations) in the framework of which mankind 
has accomplished its development, and therefore after industry in England, politics in 
France and philosophy in Germany have been developed, they have been developed for 
the world, and their world-historic significance, as also that of those nations, has thereby 
come to an end. (Marx 1975a: 281) 
 
But just because nations can start from the highest point previously achieved in a particular 
area does not mean that they will. A social force capable of starting from that point is required. 
It was at this point in their careers that the question of agency appeared to be resolved by the 
possibility of permanent revolution. 
 
Permanent Revolution as Bourgeois Revolution (1) 
 
What level of capitalist development was necessary for socialism? At one point in The German 
Ideology Marx and Engels seem to suggest that the forces of production would need to exist at 
a globally even level of development before socialism was possible (Marx and Engels 1975a: 
49, 51). During the later 1840s their attention became focussed on Europe and its colonial-
settler extensions in North America, which they saw as decisive and where the situation was 
relatively straightforward. Capitalism was the dominant mode of production only in parts of 
Western Europe and the eastern seaboard of the United States of America, and industrialization 
was still more narrowly focussed. Elsewhere the bourgeoisie were still politically and socially 
subordinate to the Old Regime. The task for Communists was therefore to encourage the 
bourgeois revolutions which would overthrow the feudal absolutist states, remove the structural 
obstacles to capitalist development and thus create the material basis for the international 
working class that would make socialism a possibility. 
The very fact that the bourgeois revolutions involved such a comprehensive reordering of 
society meant that, even before 1848, the bourgeoisie could not be the only or even necessarily 
the major social force involved in the process, since it remained a minority class, if a larger one 
than that of the existing rulers. Its leaders, consciously or unconsciously, had to mobilize the 
masses under ultimately deceptive slogans of universal right, necessary for a minority class to 
lead the coalitions that overthrew the old regimes, but disguising or simply avoiding the fact 
that exploitation would continue, albeit in new forms. But Marx was also aware that more than 
deception was involved here. The popular masses had an interest in overthrowing absolutism, 
and their methods were required to achieve and defend both the English and French 
Revolutions, methods from which the bourgeoisie themselves shrank: “Therefore, where they 
stood in opposition to the bourgeoisie, as for example in 1793 and 1794 in France, [the 
plebeians] were fighting for the implementation of the interests of the bourgeoisie, although 
not in the manner of the bourgeoisie. The whole of the French terror was nothing other than a 
plebeian manner of dealing with the enemies of the bourgeoisie, with absolutism, feudalism 
and parochialism” (Marx 1973b: 192). This raises two questions. 
One question concerned the revolutionary capacity of the bourgeoisie even at its most 
radical. The issue here was not simply the lack of social weight possessed by the bourgeoisie 
and its consequent need for allies; it was that the majority of its members would not in any case 
have demanded the necessary action without being pushed from below (Marx 1976b: 319). 
Marx’s contrast between economic readiness and political vacillation suggest that the self-
restraint of the bourgeoisie as a revolutionary class and the consequent need for representatives 
of another social class to substitute for it in the realm of political action did not begin in 
Germany in 1848, but had a longer lineage dating even further back in time even than the 
French Revolution. From the Dutch Revolt onwards, popular forces had been necessary to 
ensure victory over the absolutist regime, but has also threatened to take the revolutions in a 
more radical direction than the bourgeoisie themselves were prepared to contemplate, above 
all in relation to democracy. The French Revolution showed this process in the most developed 
form and both its most committed opponents, like Burke, and members of its extreme left, like 
Babeuf, understood the logic of escalation, whether as a threat, in the case of the former, or as 
a promise, in the case of the latter (Burke 1970: 345–349; Babeuf 1920). In reality, however, 
both men misunderstood what the outcome could have been. For even in France between 1789 
and 1794, the social forces involved were incapable of sustaining the new society of equality, 
with the result that it fell back into what was historically possible at the time, in other words, a 
bourgeois regime. The second question facing Marx and Engels as 1848 drew near was 
therefore whether this was still the only viable result that could be expected from the incipient 
German Revolution. 
Marx warned in 1847 that central though the plebeians would be to victory over the ancien 
régime, they would not hold onto power: “If therefore the proletariat overthrows the political 
rule of the bourgeoisie, its victory will only be temporary, only an element in the service of the 
bourgeois revolution itself, as in the year 1794, as long as in the course of history, in its 
‘movement,’ the material conditions have not yet been created which make necessary the 
abolition of the bourgeois mode of production and therefore also the definitive overthrow of 
the political rule of the bourgeoisie” (Marx 1976b: 319). In 1847 Marx believed that the 
material conditions did not exist for the proletariat to overthrow bourgeois rule; by 1850 he 
argued that if not already existent, they could be established in a very short time: this change 
of position was the basis of the new strategy of “permanent revolution.” 
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Marx and Engels may have been among the first people to refer to the notion in print in 
1843 and 1844 (Marx 1975b: 222; Marx and Engels 1975b: 123). It was not, however, a 
concept exclusive to them but one common to members of “the Democracy,” the alliance of 
the petty bourgeoisie, peasantry, and working class to the left of the bourgeois liberals. Their 
goal was the Social Republic—not socialism, but a regime modelled on the Jacobin state at its 
most radical; in other words one that went beyond the limits of bourgeois acceptability. During 
the course of the German Revolution of 1848 Marx and Engels held three versions of 
permanent revolution, each successively more radical as the unwillingness of the bourgeoisie 
to confront the absolutist regime grew more apparent. In the first, the bourgeoisie would ally 
with the Democracy to overthrow the existing regime, after which the Democracy removes the 
bourgeoisie to establish the Social Republic. The second, formulated when it became apparent 
that the bourgeoisie were more concerned with a potential threat to their property than with 
absolutism, involved the Democracy striking out on its own for the Social Republic—still 
remaining within the boundaries of capitalism, but intent on opening up the way for rapid 
capitalist development while a new revolution was being prepared. The third, formulated when 
it also became apparent that the leaderships of the non-working-class elements of the 
Democracy were no more willing to take the revolution forward than the bourgeoisie proper, 
involved the proletarian revolution as the only alternative to counterrevolution, but on the basis 
of an international movement led by the more advanced working classes, most importantly in 
France and Britain. Here finally is the idea that the escalation characteristic of the French 
Revolution would, in the new conditions of more advanced capitalist development, lead to the 
victory of the proletariat. 
It is the third and final version of permanent revolution that is incorporated in the most 
radical text written by Marx or Engels during this period: the “Address to the Central 
Committee of the Communist League” of March 1850. Two themes emerge from the main 
body of this work: first, that the liberal bourgeoisie and the social-reformist Democracy would 
be the most dangerous enemies of the working class when in power; second, and consequently, 
the working class needed to retain absolute organizational and political independence (Marx 
1973a: 323–324). The reference to “make the revolution permanent” in the address and the 
concluding sentence (“their battle-cry must be: The Permanent Revolution”), might lead to the 
conclusion that Marx anachronistically saw socialism as being immediately realizable. In fact, 
apart from this climactic rhetorical flourish, Marx argues for a more realistic agenda 
throughout. In the immediately preceding paragraph he writes: “Although the German workers 
cannot come to power and achieve the realization of their class interests without passing 
through a protracted revolutionary development, this time they can at least be certain that the 
first act of the approaching revolutionary drama will coincide with the direct victory of their 
own class in France and will thereby be accelerated” (Marx 1973a: 330). German workers must 
maintain their organizational and political independence from the petty bourgeoisie, to push 
the latter class beyond the satisfaction of its own demands and to continue pressing their own 
class interests even after the feudal-absolutist state has been decisively overthrown. Marx 
confirmed this position later in the same year in “The Class Struggles in France,” the 
significance being that he had always pointed to France as being the most advanced working 
movement and the one to which German workers should look for inspiration. Yet even here 
further capitalist development was necessary (Marx 1974: 45–46). 
For Marx and Engels workers not only could not retain power, they should not seek to do 
so. “We are devoted to a party which, most fortunately for it, cannot yet come to power,” said 
Marx at a meeting of Central Authority of the Communist League late in 1850: “If the 
proletariat were to come to power the measures it would introduce would be petty-bourgeois 
and not directly proletarian. Our party can only come to power when the conditions allow it to 
put its own views into practice” (Marx 1978: 628). In the same year Engels extended the 
argument back in time to the dawn of the bourgeois revolutionary era. He wrote of Thomas 
Müntzer’s role in the German Peasant War of 1525 that, while he represented the communist 
aspirations of the peasantry, these were unrealizable at the time since the only social force 
actually capable of achieving them, the working class, did not yet exist in sufficient numbers 
to play this role. As a result, all that Müntzer could have hoped to achieve were the goals of 
the bourgeoisie, “the class for whom conditions are ripe for domination,” even though they had 
signally failed to enter the field on their own behalf (Engels 1978: 469–470). In fact, it is 
questionable whether the German Lands were even ready for domination by capitalism at this 
period. Part of the case Engels wanted to convey is that the German bourgeoisie has always 
been vacillating and untrustworthy, in 1525 as in 1848, even though this meant rather 
overemphasizing the possibility of their coming to power at the former date. 
It is true that in 1850 Marx and Engels assumed that only a short period of time would be 
necessary for capitalism to develop to the point where the socialist revolution was possible. 
However, as early as 1858 Marx wrote to Engels admitting that capitalism had a much longer 
future ahead of it than either man had thought possible in 1848, and that consequently socialism 
might be a more distant prospect than they had initially hoped (Marx to Engels, 1983: 346–
347; see also Engels 1990: 513). In the meantime, what were the implications of what Marx 
called “this little corner of the earth” bringing the rest of the world under colonial domination? 
In the Preface to Capital he wrote that: “The country that is more developed industrially only 
shows, to the less developed, the image of its own future” (Marx 1976a: 91). He was not 
suggesting that all countries would take the same length of time to reach the future as the 
original metropolitan powers, nor that arriving there would have the same implications for late 
developers, but neither was he suggesting that they could bypass sections of the road. 
 
Uneven Development Revived 
 
It was the Russian Populist, Alexander Herzen, who in the 1850s became the first thinker since 
the Scottish Enlightenment to notice a decisive fact about late development: “Human 
development is a form of chronological unfairness, since latecomers are able to profit by the 
labours of their predecessors without paying the same price” (quoted in Berlin 1960: xx). 
Herzen himself held analogous views to those of Marx on Germany concerning the prospects 
for socialism in Russia; Marx concerning the possibility made the same point in relation to his 
own country in the late 1860s (Herzen 1956: 578). Others among his Populist comrades were 
more optimistic. “History, like a granny,” wrote Nikolai Chernyshevskii in A Critique of 
Philosophical Prejudices against Communal Ownership (1859), “is terribly fond of younger 
grandchildren.” This was not merely a piece of Russian folk-wisdom: “We were concerned to 
answer the question of whether a given social phenomenon has to pass through all the logical 
moments in the real life of every society, or whether under favourable circumstances it can leap 
from the first or second stage of development directly to the fifth or sixth, omitting the ones in 
the middle, as happens with the phenomena of individual life and in the processes of physical 
nature.” Chernyshevskii’s own answer was unequivocal: “under the influence of the high 
development which a certain phenomenon of social life has attained among the most advanced 
peoples, this phenomenon can develop very swiftly among other peoples, and rise from a lower 
level straight to a higher one, passing over the intermediate logical moments” (Chernyshevskii 
1983: 187, 188). Vasily Vorontsov made similar comments in The Fates of Capitalism in 
Russia (1882): “The countries which are latecomers to the arena of history have a great 
privilege in comparison with their foregoers, a privilege consisting in the fact that accumulated 
historical experience of other countries enables them to work out a relatively true image of 
their own next step and to strive for what the others have already achieved not instinctively but 
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consciously, not groping in the dark but knowing what should be avoided on the way. To these 
peculiarly privileged countries belongs also Russia” (quoted in Walicki 1969: 115–116). 
Asked to comment on Russian developments, Marx suggested, for the first and only time, 
that capitalist development there could be circumvented altogether. In 1877 Marx argued that 
Russia did not need to undergo capitalist development but could move directly to socialism 
through the institution of the peasant commune or mir. If not, then Russia would be condemned 
to suffer all that the peasant populations of the West had suffered. But Marx also makes two 
qualifications. First, although the Russian peasant commune may provide the launching pad for 
the advance to communism in Russia, the advance of capitalism is already undermining the 
possibility of that happening. Second, even if the latter development does come to fruition, it 
will not replicate exactly the earlier process in Western Europe (Marx 1989: 199, 200; see also 
Marx to Zasulich, 1992: 72). Under what conditions might the peasant commune play the role 
that Marx has suggested for it? These were outlined the following year in a preface, published 
under the names of both men, for the second Russian edition of the Manifesto. Here, revolution 
in Russia that may act as the spark, but success is still dependent on victory of the proletariat 
in the West (Marx and Engels 1989: 42). That the victory of a revolutionary movement in the 
West could establish a socialist context for Russian development and thus avoid the fate of 
capitalism was in their view a possibility, but by no means a certainty. By the early 1890s it 
had become clear which direction events had taken and Engels changed his position 
accordingly. In his last writings, he drew up a balance sheet that is clearly loaded against those 
who still expected the peasant commune to act as the social basis of the Russian revolution. In 
the absence of revolution in the West, and the beginning of capitalist development in Russia, 
the opportunity to bypass bourgeois society had passed (Engels 2005a: 214; 1990: 423, 424, 
431). 
The second generation of Marxists took as their text on development a passage from the 
same work by Marx in which he identified the different epochs of human history, the “Preface” 
to A Contribution To The Critique Of Political Economy: “No social order is ever destroyed 
before all the productive forces for which it is sufficient have been developed, and new and 
superior relations of production never replace older ones before the material conditions for 
their existence have matured within the framework of the old society” (Marx 1975c: 425–426). 
As subsequent debates around the nature of the forthcoming Russian Revolution were to show, 
the significance of this passage depended on whether it was interpreted as meaning that 
material conditions had to be “mature” in every single state before socialism could become a 
practical possibility, or simply a number of the more advanced states, in which successful 
revolutions could come to aid of the less advanced. The theoretical leaders of the Second 
International tended towards the first interpretation and the nation in which this position was 
articulated and upheld more rigorously than any other was, appropriately enough, Russia, in 
whose future Marx and Engels had briefly glimpsed a possible alternative, before Engels 
ultimately dismissed it. 
The key figure on the Russian Marxist left was Georgi Plekhanov. Given the opposition 
which Plekhanov showed for the Russian Revolution towards the end of his life, it is important 
not to read back later positions onto those of an earlier period, for Plekhanov was perhaps the 
most sophisticated thinker of his entire generational cohort. His recognition of the necessity for 
capitalism in Russia was accompanied by an insistence that the working class which it was 
bringing into being had to struggle against the new bourgeoisie as hard as it did against the 
feudal-absolutist state against which both classes were ostensibly opposed. Indeed, he was 
initially prepared to echo Marx’s more unorthodox pronouncements concerning the prospects 
for Russian development (Plekhanov 1961a: 79). But this element of his thought was quickly 
submerged by the need to emphasise the necessity of capitalist development against the 
Populists. The ultimate outcome of the revolution in Russia, given the preponderance of land-
hungry peasantry, could only be the more extensive implantation of capitalist economy in the 
countryside, not the agrarian communism predicted by the Populists (Plekhanov 1961b: 364–
366). If this was true for Russia, then it was even more so for those states, like China, which 
were further east in geographical terms and further behind in developmental terms: “The West 
European revolution will be mighty, but not almighty. To have a decisive influence on other 
countries, the socialist countries of the West will need some kind of vehicle for that influence. 
‘International exchange’ is a powerful vehicle, but it is not almighty either” (Plekhanov 1961b: 
357–358). This is a more pessimistic perspective conclusion than that of Engels. It is important 
to note that, for Plekhanov at least, this was not a racist or paternalist discourse. He maintained 
essentially the same position in relation to the history of Western Europe: “Everywhere there 
has been imitation; but the imitator is separated from his model by all the distance which exists 
between the society which gave him, the imitator, birth and the society in which the model 
lived.” Plekhanov correctly notes that Locke was the greatest influence on French philosophers 
of the eighteenth century: “Yet, between Locke and his French pupils there is precisely that 
same distance, which separated English society at the time of the ‘Glorious Revolution’ from 
French society as it was several decades before the ‘Great Rebellion’ of the French people.” 
His conclusion? “Thus the influence of the literature of one country on the literature of another 
is directly proportional to the similarity of the social relations of those countries. It does not 
exist at all when that similarity is near to zero” (Plekhanov 1961c: 704, 705). 
But what if there were similarities, but only in particular areas of social life? In this context, 
we should note remarks from 1896 by Labriola, Trotsky’s most important philosophical 
influence, not least because of his emphasis on totality (Trotsky 1975b: 123–124, 133). Russian 
industrialization, Labriola wrote, “seems destined to put under our eyes, as in an epitome, all 
the phases, even the most extreme, of our history” (Labriola 1908: 133). But even here Labriola 
suggests the coexistence of forms rather than their mutual interpenetration. A more important 
forerunner to Trotsky in this respect was Luxemburg in a brilliant article, also from 1896, on 
the Ottoman Empire. 
Luxemburg noted that until the end of the eighteenth century, Turkey had been oppressive 
for the majority of the people but stable. These conditions changed during the nineteenth 
century: “Shaken by conflict with the strong, centralised states of Europe, but especially 
threatened by Russia, Turkey found itself compelled to introduce domestic reforms [that] 
abolished the feudal government, and in its place introduced a centralised bureaucracy, a 
standing army and a new financial system.” The cost of these reforms was paid in taxation and 
duties by the population, burdens that went toward maintaining a hybrid form of state: “In a 
strange mixture of modern and medieval principles, it consists of an immense number of 
administrative authorities, courts and assemblies, which are bound to the capital city in an 
extremely centralised manner in their conduct; but at the same time all public positions are de 
facto venal, and are not paid by the central government, but are mostly financed by revenue 
from the local population—a kind of bureaucratic benefice.” The effect was “a terrible 
deterioration in the material conditions of the people”: “But what made them particularly 
unbearable was a quite modern feature that had become involved in the situation—namely, 
insecurity: the irregular tax system, the fluctuating relations of land ownership, but above all 
the money economy as a result of the transformation of tax in kind into tax in money and the 
development of foreign trade.” As Luxemburg notes, these changes were “in a certain respect, 
reminiscent of Russia.” But with one crucial difference, whereas in Russia the reforms of 1861 
and after established the basis for capitalist development and industrialisation, “in Turkey an 
economic transformation corresponding to the modern reforms was completely lacking” 
(Luxemburg 2003: 38–40). 
We do not know whether or not Trotsky was aware of Luxemburg’s article. Given the extent 
of her influence on Kautsky prior to the Russian Revolution of 1905, Luxemburg’s 
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observations may well have inspired his brief contrast between Russia and Turkey in “The 
American Worker,” a work that in turn influenced Trotsky’s original formulation of permanent 
revolution (Kautsky 2009b: 621–625). Nevertheless, her discussion of the destabilizing effects 
of capitalist modernity was not reflected in Kautsky’s article nor was it a central feature of 
Trotsky’s original argument. 
 
Permanent Revolution as Bourgeois Revolution (2) 
 
The term “permanent revolution” re-entered Marxist debates simultaneously with these 
discussions of unevenness. The first person to revive it seems to have been the Russian 
revolutionary David Ryazanov during his 1903 critique of the draft programme of Iskra, the 
paper of the RSDWP (Ryazanov 2009: 131). Within a year, however, it had once more become 
part of general discourse of the centre and left wings of the Second International in Central and 
Eastern Europe, as a means of encapsulating how the working class would have to carry out 
the bourgeois revolution in Russia. In addition to Ryazanov, Kautsky, Lenin, Luxemburg, 
Mehring, Plekhanov, Parvus, and Trotsky all held this perspective, with only Lenin refusing 
the actual term “permanent revolution” and only Trotsky investing the term with a significantly 
different content. But even Lenin’s refusal was semantic rather than substantive. During a 
discussion about the need to prepare for a forthcoming struggle between the rural proletariat 
and the peasant bourgeoisie, written during the revolution of 1905, he wrote: “For from the 
democratic revolution we shall at once, and precisely in accordance with the measure of our 
strength, the strength of the class-conscious and organized proletariat, begin to pass to the 
socialist revolution. We stand for uninterrupted revolution. We shall not stop half-way” (Lenin 
1962: 237–238). 
It is important to insist on this relative unanimity, since there is a long-established tradition, 
widely held in the Trotskyist movement but also influential in some academic accounts, of 
reducing pre-revolutionary views about the nature of the Russian Revolution into a tripartite 
structure established by Trotsky. In a late article he summarized the “three conceptions of the 
Russian Revolution” associated respectively with the Mensheviks, Lenin (in fact representing 
the collective Bolshevik position), and himself (Trotsky 1973b: 71–72). It is accurate insofar 
as it deals with the division of opinion within Russia between the revolutions of 1905 and 
October 1917, but “Lenin’s position” was in fact a variant of the dominant position of the centre 
and left of the Second International, which, before the first of these dates at least, was also 
shared by the Mensheviks. Löwy added a fourth conception to this list, associated with Parvus 
and Luxemburg, and a fifth associated with Kautsky occupying a position halfway between 
those of Lenin and Luxemburg (Löwy 1981: 43; see also Larsson 1970: chapter 9 for a slightly 
different list). I do not find this approach, which could be extended until there are as many 
different “conceptions” as there were participants in the debate, particularly helpful. It might 
be more useful to see the second conception, between those of the Mensheviks and Trotsky, as 
involving a continuum of views, the main difference between them being the extent to which 
they regarded the peasantry as capable of independent activity, the nature of the relationship 
between the working class and the peasantry, and whether one or both of these classes would 
either seek to form a post-revolutionary government or abdicate immediately in favour of 
representatives of the bourgeoisie (for these debates, see Day and Gaido 2009: 32–54; Geras 
1976: 252–304; Larsson 1970: 206–304; and Löwy 1981: chapter 2). Two figures were most 
responsible for Trotsky’s radicalization of the concept and for rendering it quite different from 
that of anyone else in the Marxist tradition: Parvus and Kautsky. 
Trotsky had a close intellectual and political partnership with Parvus during the latter half 
of 1904 and all through 1905. Parvus had recognized affinities with his own work in Trotsky’s 
article “Up to the Ninth of January” and wrote a preface for the first edition, which appeared 
early in 1905. In particular, Trotsky seems to have been influenced by what, in comparison to 
his own work at this time, was the far greater historical depth of Parvus’s work, particularly in 
relation to the origins of the Russian state and, later, to the emergence of capitalism in Russia, 
but also his sense of how Russia existed with a world system in which the world powers were 
gearing up for war (Parvus 2009: 252 [editorial note]). Parvus rightly rejected the notion that 
large-scale capitalists themselves had ever been revolutionary, but saw that previously the 
lower levels of the economic class, those closest to the petty bourgeoisie, had acted as a 
revolutionary force. In addition to its fear of the working class, the weakness of the Russian 
bourgeoisie as a historical latecomer was that it did not have this more plebeian wing to act as 
a stimulus and support for its “noneconomic” element, the liberal professions and those groups 
that were only beginning to be classified in Germany as the New Middle Class. The former had 
been important as a component of revolutionary movements between 1789 and 1848, and the 
latter would become an equally important component of revolutionary movements later in the 
twentieth century; but in the contemporary Russian context, Parvus pointed to their 
fragmentation and vacillation (Parvus 2009: 265). But why was the Russian proletariat so prone 
to “revolutionism”? Parvus offers the beginning of an explanation in his comments on the 
formation of “factory cities and centres of world trade”: “The very same pattern that hindered 
the development of petty-bourgeois democracy served to benefit the class consciousness of the 
proletariat in Russia, namely, the weak development of the handicraft form of production. The 
proletariat was immediately concentrated in the factories” (Parvus 2009: 268). 
Until the end of his life Trotsky continued to pay homage to the influence that Parvus 
exercised over him during this period. But, like everyone else during the 1905 Revolution apart 
from Trotsky himself, Parvus never imagined that it could have a socialist outcome. As Trotsky 
wrote of Parvus’s position: “His prognosis indicated, therefore, not the transformation of the 
democratic revolution into the socialist revolution but only the establishment in Russia of a 
regime of worker’s democracy of the Australian type, where on the basis of a farmers’ system 
there arose for the first time a labour government which did not go beyond the framework of a 
bourgeois state.” Trotsky rejected this comparison (the only one available to Parvus at the time) 
on the grounds that Australia had developed within a capitalist framework from the start, that 
the government was based on a relatively privileged working class, and that neither of these 
conditions applied to Russia (Trotsky 1973b: 68–69). 
Kautsky’s general theoretical influence on Trotsky was great, as it was on most Marxists, 
at least until the end of the first decade of the twentieth century. “Kautsky was undoubtedly the 
foremost theoretician of the Second International,” wrote Trotsky in 1919, “and for the better 
part of his conscious life he represented and gave generalized expression to the best aspects of 
the Second International” (Trotsky 1977: 29–30; see also Trotsky 1973a: 9–10). Kautsky’s 
specific theoretical influence on Trotsky’s version of permanent revolution seems to have been 
through two texts, one published before Trotsky had begun the process of rethinking the 
concept, the other after Trotsky had completed it but before he published a detailed presentation 
of his conclusions: in the latter case Kautsky was mainly responsible for deepening the 
historical and sociological foundations of Trotsky’s argument. In the first text, “Revolutionary 
Questions,” from November 1904, Kautsky argues the widely accepted case that a revolution 
in Western Europe would have a detonative effect in the eastern part of the continent, but he 
then goes on to make the bolder and less conventional argument, in effect allowing that the 
spatial priority of influence might be reversed: “They [the Eastern European nations] may even 
come to the foreground because they are not hindered by the ballast of traditions that the older 
nations have to drag along. . . That can happen. But as we already said, we have gone beyond 
the field of discernible necessity and are present considering only possibilities” (Kautsky 
2009a: 219). 
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The second text by Kautsky to have influenced Trotsky was an article of February 1906, 
“The American Worker,” to which I have already referred, in which the former attempted to 
establish the circumstances in which a working class can emerge without being “hindered” by 
“tradition.” Here, Kautsky tried to establish, for the first time since the less developed remarks 
by Parvus the previous year, not only why the working class in Russia is politically militant 
but also why it is more politically militant than those areas of the West that are the most 
developed in capitalist terms: 
 
It is certainly a peculiar phenomenon that the Russian proletariat [of all national sections 
of the working class] should show us our future—as far as, not the organization of capital, 
but the rebellion of the working class is concerned—because Russia is, of all the great 
states of the capitalist world, the most backward. This seems to contradict the materialist 
conception of history, according to which economic development constitutes the basis of 
politics. But in fact it only contradicts that kind of historical materialism of which our 
opponents and critics accuse us, by which they understand a ready-to-hand model, and 
not a method of inquiry. (Kautsky 2009b: 621) 
 
Kautsky then develops his argument with reference to the nature of the Russian absolutist 
state—again deepening the insights of Parvus. Here his comparison is not a more advanced 
state like the United States, but a more backward one: Turkey. In the case of both Russia and 
Turkey the state grew militarily, bureaucratically, and fiscally in order to compete in 
geopolitical terms with the Western European powers, accruing a massive national debt in both 
cases. There was, however, a major difference between Turkey and Russia: “Turkey has 
become so helpless that it must inevitably submit to the dictate of foreigners. It exists as an 
independent state only thanks to the jealousy of the different powers, none of which can have 
the whole booty alone. . . . But Russia was not as helpless as Turkey.” Russia had access to 
capital from the West where capitalists looking for new areas of investment and provided the 
basis for a historically unprecedented process of industrialization: “This transformed a great 
part of the Russian proletarians from lumpen proletarians or indigent small peasants into wage-
workers, from timid and servile beggars into decided revolutionary fighters. But this growth of 
a strong fighting proletariat was not paralleled by the growth of a similarly strong Russian 
capitalist class.” The proletariat has the possibility of uniting all the most vital national forces 
around it in the struggle against foreign-based capital and the absolutist state that protects it: 
“In this way, the Russian workers are able to exert a strong political influence, and the struggle 
for liberation of the land from the strangling octopus of absolutism has become a duel between 
the Czar and the working class; a duel in which the peasants provide an indispensable 
assistance, but in which they can by no means play a leading role” (Kautsky 2009b: 624). The 
nature of the Russian state helped condition the nature of the working-class response, as did 
the nature of the American state, but in the opposite direction: “As soon as the [Russian] 
proletariat began to move, it immediately came across almost insuperable obstacles in every 
direction, experienced in the most painful way the insanity of the political situation, learned to 
hate it, and felt compelled to fight against it. It was impossible to attempt to reform this 
situation; the only possible course was a complete revolution of the established order. . . . The 
American worker has not been, up till now, forced to inquire into and oppose the totality of the 
existing social order” (Kautsky 2009b: 642–643). 
With the publication of this article, the intellectual components out of which Trotsky would 
produce his first breakthrough were in place. All that remained to complete his thought, as far 
as permanent revolution was concerned, was the fact of the 1905 Revolution itself. 
 
Theorising Uneven Development 
 We will return to the 1905 revolution in part two of this article. It was the aftermath that the 
concept of uneven development was properly theorised for the first time, thus providing the 
final component of what would become the concept of uneven and combined development. 
Central to this were a group of Marxist thinkers who noted the way in which more backward 
states did not recapitulate the entire history of capitalist development again, but began at most 
advanced forms of technology and the labour process. The Austro-Marxist Rudolf Hilferding 
formulated the position in more general terms immediately prior to the First World War, in his 
classic work Finance Capital: 
 
Capitalist development does not take place independently in each individual country, but 
instead capitalist relations of production and exploitation were imported along with 
capital from abroad, and indeed imported at the level already attained in the most 
advanced country. Just as a newly established industry today does not develop from 
handicraft beginnings and techniques into a modern giant concern, but is established from 
the outset as an advanced capitalist enterprise, so capitalism is now imported into a new 
country in its most advanced form and exerts its revolutionary effects far more strongly 
and in a much shorter time than was the case, for instance, in the capitalist development 
of Holland and England. (Hilferding 1981: 322–323) 
 
Marxists like Gramsci who, unlike Hilferding, supported the Russian Revolution, identified the 
same process but also saw in it a means of avoiding capitalist development. Some of Gramsci’s 
early comments on uneven development are merely banal, including such revelations as 
“capitalism is a world historical phenomenon, and its uneven development means that 
individual nations cannot be at the same level of economic development at the same time” 
(Gramsci 1977a: 69). Gramsci did, however, make rather more penetrating comments in 1917 
in an article entitled “The Revolution against Capital,” in which he welcomed the October 
Revolution as a practical rejection of the stageism of the Second International: 
 
Why should [the Russian people] wait for the history of England to be repeated in Russia, 
for the bourgeoisie to arise, for the class struggle to begin, so that class consciousness 
may be formed and the final catastrophe of the capitalist world eventually hit them? The 
Russian people—or at least a minority of the Russian people—has already passed 
through these experiences in thought. It has gone beyond them. It will make use of them 
now to assert itself just as it will make use of Western Capitalist experience to bring itself 
rapidly to the same level of production as the capitalist world. (1977b: 36) 
 
For Gramsci the Russian experience of uneven development was a further extension of what 
had already occurred within the capitalist system: “In capitalist terms, North America is more 
advanced than England, because the Anglo-Saxons in North America took off at once from the 
level England had reached only after long evolution” (Gramsci 1977b: 36). 
These insights were not restricted to Marxists. In 1915 the radical American economist 
Thorstein Veblen claimed–with some exaggeration—that in both economic and political terms 
Germany in 1870 had been 250 years behind England. By the time of the First World War 
Germany had overcome this lag, but only in some respects. Like Japan, “Modern technology 
has come to the Germans ready-made” (Veblen 1939: 65–66, 85–86). Veblen did recognize, 
however, that such technologies would not necessarily overcome ideological or political 
backwardness, with which it could coexist for a period at least. 
By the First World War then, a group of politically diverse thinkers had arrived at broadly 
similar conclusions about how capitalism had developed since the first epoch of bourgeois 
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revolutions from above had ended in 1871. Specifically, they recognised that there were 
advantages in starting from a relatively backward position. It was possible to begin 
industrialisation with the most advanced forms of technology and industrial organisation, rather 
than work through all the stages of development that their predecessors had experienced. 
Indeed, it was impossible for them to avoid doing so if they wished to enter the competitive 
struggle between national capitals with any hope of success. 
Down to this point uneven development had largely been a descriptive concept, without 
specific political implications. The outbreak of war in 1914 changed that. In Imperialism: The 
Highest Stage of Capitalism (1916) Lenin wrote that “the uneven and spasmodic development 
of individual enterprises, individual branches of industry and individual countries is inevitable 
under the capitalist system” (Lenin 1964: 241). Essentially, he argued that by the beginning of 
the twentieth century uneven development had acquired three main aspects. The first, which as 
we have seen was widely recognised, was the process by which the advanced states had reached 
their leading positions within the structured inequality of the world system. The pressure of 
military competition between the actual or aspirant great powers forced some of the absolutist 
states among them to adopt the level of economic and industrial development already achieved 
by their capitalist rivals: those who did so, in Germany, Italy, and Japan had leaderships that 
realized that this was a necessity if they were to have any chance not just of continuing to 
successfully compete in geopolitical terms but of surviving near the summit of the states 
system. In very compressed timescales they had been able to adopt the socio-economic 
achievements of Britain to the extent that they became recognizably the same kind of societies, 
without necessarily reproducing every characteristic of the Anglo-Saxon pioneer: where 
backwardness remained it tended to be in the nature of the political regimes led by monarchs 
or emperors supported by a landowning aristocracy. By the outbreak of the First World War 
membership of the dominant states was essentially fixed. What remained was the second aspect 
of uneven development: the ongoing rivalry between the great powers that involved them 
constantly trying to catch up and overtake each other in a contest for both economic and 
geopolitical supremacy that would continue as long as capitalism itself. This rivalry led in turn 
to a third aspect: the developed imperialist states collectively but competitively asserting their 
dominance over two other types, described by Lenin as “the colonies themselves” and “the 
diverse forms of dependent countries which, politically are formally independent but in fact, 
are enmeshed in the net of financial and diplomatic dependence,” like Argentina and Portugal 
(Lenin 1964: 263–264). Colonial expansion prevented some of the societies subject to it from 
developing at all, and in the case of the most undeveloped, the peoples involved suffered near 
or complete extermination and their lands were taken by settlers. More often the peoples 
survived, but their social systems were immobilized by imperial powers interested in strategic 
advantage or plunder, or both. 
The central point here is very few states were capable of joining the ranks of the imperialist 
powers; their existence acts as a block to the less developed repeating the experience of 
Scotland in the eighteenth century or (to use Lenin’s own examples) of the United States, 
Germany, and Japan in the nineteenth. But some states, of which Russia was pre-eminent, could 
at least adopt aspects of the more developed, even if they could not reproduce their socio-
economic structures in their entirety. The implications, previously noted by only a handful of 
Marxists like Labriola and Luxemburg, were that different temporalities could coexist within 
the same social formations. What remained lacking, on the eve of the October Revolution, was 
any sense of what the social and political implications were. 
 
*** 
 
Trotsky built on the positions which I have discussed here—but also transcended them. His 
innovations came in two stages. The first, in 1905–1906, involved his unique perspective on 
permanent revolution in which the working class is not only the driving force of the bourgeois 
revolution, but also potentially capable of moving directly on to socialism, given the right 
international conditions. The second, in 1930, was his insight that where differing temporalities 
existed within a social formation, they did not simply sit side-by-side (“unevenness”), but 
impacted on each other in ways which were greatly conducive to revolutionary explosions 
(“combination”). These are the subject of part two. 
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